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One of the most pressing challenges facing the global surveillance of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is the gener-
ation, sharing, systematic analysis and dissemination of data in low-resource settings. Numerous agencies and
initiatives are working to support the development of globally distributed microbiology capacity, but the routine
generation of a sustainable flow of reliable data will take time to establish before it can deliver a clinical and
public health impact. By contrast, there are a large number of pharma- and academia-led initiatives that have
generated a wealth of data on AMR and drug-resistant infections in low-resource settings, together with high-
volume data generation by private laboratories. Here, we explore how untapped sources of data could provide a
short-term solution that bridges the gap between now and the time when routine surveillance capacity will have
been established and how this could continue to support surveillance efforts in the future. We discuss the bene-
fits and limitations of data generated by these sources, the mechanisms and barriers to making this accessible
and how academia and pharma might support the development of laboratory and analytical capacity. We pro-
vide key actions that will be required to harness these data, including: a mapping exercise; creating mechanisms
for data sharing; use of data to support national action plans; facilitating access to and use of data by the WHO
Global Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance System; and innovation in data capture, analysis and sharing.
Introduction
Surveillance is central to understanding the global burden of anti-
microbial resistance (AMR). The generation of surveillance data
begins with appropriate sampling of patients with a suspected in-
fectious disease (diagnostic stewardship). Surveillance of sepsis is
one example of this, although other specimen types will be
required for more comprehensive surveillance. Culture and anti-
microbial susceptibility testing of pathogens can improve individ-
ual patient management through optimization of drug therapy
and supports the appropriate use of drugs (antibiotic stewardship).
These data are commonly collated to inform local empirical pre-
scribing policies for patients presenting with infectious disease syn-
dromes. National data may then be collected by ministries of
health for the purposes of surveillance, establishing evidence-
based guidelines, creating programmes of prevention and re-
source planning. Finally, national data may be submitted to global
surveillance initiatives, which are used to document and track
rates of resistance over time, signal where and when interventions
are needed and identify countries that require support to build cap-
acity. The most prominent global initiative for the surveillance of
bacterial pathogens (excluding TB) is the WHO Global
Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance System (GLASS),1 which col-
lects and reports data on resistance rates aggregated by country.
This description of the generation, flow and analysis of AMR
data represents an ideal situation in which locally generated
microbiological results move from a patient care setting to a na-
tional or supranational network, but the reality is that these data
are fragmented and dispersed. A recent review commissioned by
the Fleming Fund created an inventory of supranational AMR sur-
veillance networks in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs)
between January 2000 and August 2017.2,3 This identified 72
supranational networks for AMR surveillance of bacteria, fungi,
HIV, TB and malaria, of which 34 are ongoing.2,3 Their median dur-
ation was 6 years (range 1–70 years) and the median number of
LMICs included in each network was 8 (range 1–67). This scenario
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is not limited to the lowest-resource settings. A review of European
AMR surveillance found similar fragmentation and heterogeneity,
with numerous local and national systems that lacked coordin-
ation, harmonization and information-sharing with international
networks.4 There was also inadequate standardization of epi-
demiological definitions, samples and data collected, microbio-
logical testing methods and data-sharing policies.4
Categorization of the 72 LMIC networks identified in the review
revealed that the minority (n"26) were led by governments or
the WHO, with the remainder being associated with academia
(n"24) or pharma (n"22).2,3 The number of networks that pro-
vided unrestricted access to the data was low (n"3); the remain-
der were closed (no access) (n"38) or categorized as ‘shared or
unclear’ (n"31; shared meaning that data sharing is restricted to
specific groups or consortium members). The proportion of net-
works identified for bacteria (excluding TB) classified by the type of
network provider is reproduced in Figure 1. Although this does not
equate to the proportion of data generated by each network, it is
notable that for bacterial pathogens the majority of networks are
led by researchers and pharma. This represents a substantial un-
tapped source of data from settings where the need for surveil-
lance data is greatest and could provide a short-term solution that
bridges the gap between now and the time when routine surveil-
lance capacity will have been established.
The purpose of this article is to explore how such information
generated in countries with weak AMR surveillance systems could
be harnessed for patient and public health, including consideration
of the strengths and weaknesses of these data, mechanisms to in-
crease their standardization, harmonization and sharing, and the
benefits that could be derived by investing in innovation.
Alternative sources of AMR data generated in
LMICs
Pharma
Pharmaceutical companies generate a large volume of high-
quality bacterial susceptibility data before and after new agents
are marketed, in order to fulfil regulatory requirements. These
data are largely undisclosed, but some companies are now provid-
ing aggregated data, including Pfizer, which has developed ATLAS
(Antimicrobial Testing Leadership and Surveillance), a searchable
database on resistance to Pfizer anti-infective agents.5 The SENTRY
Antimicrobial Surveillance Program is a notable commercial sur-
veillance programme run by JMI Laboratories since 1997 that col-
lects data from .200 sites worldwide,6 largely from the USA and
Europe. Findings based on aggregated data of specific species or
genera are published, but the dataset is proprietary and not avail-
able for wider use. GSK began the Survey of Antibiotic Resistance
(SOAR) study in 2002. This focuses on the effectiveness of antibiot-
ics in the treatment of community-acquired respiratory tract infec-
tions.7 SOAR concentrates in particular on countries and regions
for which little other susceptibility data are available; the findings
are regularly reported in the published literature.8,9
Pharma data have several strengths. Isolates are obtained from
a global distribution. Organism identification and susceptibility test-
ing procedures are strictly standardized and quality controlled
according to international standards. Isolates are transported and
retested in a central accredited laboratory, ensuring reliability and
reproducibility of results. However, there are several notable disad-
vantages. There are often no metadata (clinical presentation and
outcomes or demographic information) associated with the isolates.
Organism sampling fulfils the requirements of the particular pharma
project rather than being representative or generalizable to the local
population and centralized testing means that quality-controlled
test data are not available to guide individual patient care; also, local
laboratories do not benefit from improved quality management as
a result of participation. Locations perceived to represent small mar-
kets are typically under-represented. Furthermore, there is no infor-
mation on denominator data and so the results may be biased and
may not reflect the true burden of resistance in the area tested.
Academia
Researchers generate a wealth of data on AMR in numerous
LMICs. The reasons for data generation include the study of infec-
tious disease aetiology and associated antimicrobial susceptibility,
therapeutic drug trials and studies on disease pathogenesis and
the molecular biology of bacteria. Some research laboratories
have become embedded within district hospitals or other health-
care facilities in LMICs where they provide the only source of on-
going diagnostic microbiology, adopting a model in which research
and the provision of microbiological services work in partnership.
Compared with pharma data, academic data often provide greater
depth of information for specific populations (e.g. all patients
treated in a particular hospital) and many have been operating for
several years or even decades.
Research data have several potential strengths. Laboratories
may be subject to good laboratory practice when the information
Academic
(n= 13)
Pharma (n= 21)
WHO/
governmental
(n= 10)
Figure 1. AMR surveillance networks since 2000. Sunburst chart repre-
senting 44 supranational networks performing AMR surveillance in bac-
teria (not including TB) categorized according to their lead organization
type (pharmaceutical industry, academia, WHO/governmental).
Adapted from reference 1.
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generated is performed to specific standards, supported by meth-
ods that are rigorously evaluated through robust quality-assur-
ance and quality-control programmes. The methods used to
generate bacterial susceptibility data are notoriously error prone
and data generated outside of quality-controlled laboratories may
be of suboptimal quality;10,11 the inclusion of quality-assured re-
search data in national and global databases could increase the
proportion of accurate data points. Patient information may also
be collected on clinical presentation, duration of hospital stay, anti-
biotic treatment, complications and outcome. Furthermore,
understanding the trajectory for resistance often requires evalu-
ation of susceptibility data over long timescales and newer nation-
al surveillance programmes may not yet have sufficient
retrospective information to make the most of new data.
Researcher-defined infectious disease aetiology and common
susceptibility patterns, even if determined intermittently, support
empirical prescribing in settings where the treatment of febrile ill-
ness is based on clinical features and there is no funding to offer
routine testing to patients. Empirical prescribing may result in over-
use of antibiotics and increased rates of resistance. In the longer
term, the ideal would be to have a global surveillance programme
that promotes laboratory testing for better patient care and
directed antibiotic therapy associated with antibiotic stewardship.
In the short term, however, empirical prescribing is an essential ap-
proach that saves lives, provided that data are sufficiently contem-
poraneous. Although not always the case, research-driven AMR
data may not be generated with sufficient speed to provide infor-
mation that guides individual patient treatment.
When research laboratories are embedded in district hospitals
in rural areas (as they often are) inclusion of their data in global
databases can also go some way to balancing the selection bias
that can arise. For example, WHO GLASS requires participating
countries to establish at least one surveillance site and then ex-
tend the number over time. In LMICs where diagnostic microbiol-
ogy laboratories are scarce, these are most likely to be situated in
tertiary hospitals. Bacteria isolated at tertiary hospitals in any part
of the world are more likely to be associated with patients with
more severe or complex disease, patients who have received nu-
merous courses of antibiotics, patients with prolonged hospitaliza-
tion and those transferred from other hospitals with hospital-
acquired infection, all of which will lead to over-representation of
bacterial resistance compared with patients in district hospitals or
in the wider community.
Research-generated data also have several potential limita-
tions. Data may be biased, including ascertainment and sampling
biases.12 For example, the study design may target patient subsets
that do not reflect the wider population with infectious diseases,
such as sampling of patients within cohorts that have better ac-
cess to care or patients with the most severe infection syndromes.
Since a proportion of bloodstream infections will be hospital
acquired, studies of severe invasive disease may inflate rates of re-
sistance and may not capture milder forms of community-
associated infection in patients treated as outpatients, which may
be caused by organisms with lower AMR. Research data may also
include duplicate samples. Six main types of potential bias that
may influence the validity or interpretation of surveillance
data have been identified and these provide a framework for
reviewing the use of research data in AMR surveillance (use of inad-
equate or inappropriate denominator data; case definitions; case
ascertainment; sampling bias; failure to deal with multiple
occurrences; and biases related to laboratory practice and
procedures).13
Private laboratories
A source of susceptibility data that may remain unseen by national
surveillance systems, particularly in many LMIC settings, are
laboratories in private hospitals that generate data for patient
care.14–16 The quality of data generated by private laboratories
varies considerably, but those that are accredited and perform qual-
ity-assured services produce data of similar or better quality than
that produced by public laboratories. In India, almost all medical
laboratories accredited by the National Accreditation Board for
Testing and Calibration Laboratories (NABL) are in the private sector
and, in South Africa, .80% of South African National Accreditation
System (SANAS)-accredited medical laboratories are in the private
sector.15 This has led to calls to utilize these data and the inclusion
of such data by initiatives such as ResistanceMap.17 This displays
AMR data on 12 bacterial species isolated in 49 countries, collected
between 1999 to 2015 (depending on the country), together with
antibiotic consumption data from 75 countries between 2000 and
2014. The primary sources of data are public and private laboratory
networks that routinely collect susceptibility results, but data from
India come exclusively from the private sector.
Private laboratories can provide extensive datasets for popula-
tions for whom there is a very limited supply of reliable AMR data
from alternative sources, but again can suffer from the types of
bias already described for research data. Furthermore, these labo-
ratories often serve a subset of more affluent people, including
medical tourists and members of the expatriate community,
which may not provide an accurate representation of rates of re-
sistance for similar types of infection in the wider population.
Barriers to using alternative sources of AMR
data from LMICs
Despite the obvious utility of placing AMR surveillance data gener-
ated by academia, pharma or private laboratories into the public
domain, very little of these data generated in LMICs is utilized by
organizations involved in regional or global surveillance. There are
several barriers that prevent this from happening. Data are held in
numerous silos with highly restricted access. Academics generate
data that usually remain private until published in peer-reviewed
journals; individual patient-level data may not be released or may
be delayed by several years from the point of collection because of
the time taken to analyse, write and publish. Pharma companies
have to jump through several legal hoops before they release their
data into the public domain. Even if researchers and pharma com-
panies are keen to deposit data towards global analyses, data ag-
gregation is hampered by a lack of harmonization in data
collection, a lack of tools that allow easy data deposition and the
lack of a framework that prevents publication of their data by un-
scrupulous competitors. Furthermore, GLASS collects and reports
data on resistance rates aggregated at national level by ministries
of health and cannot currently accept information generated by
research activities or pharma. In general, national programmes
take ownership of in-country surveillance activities and agreement
may not be reached for direct data deposition to WHO GLASS by
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non-governmental groups. Furthermore, AMR surveillance data
can represent potentially sensitive data, particularly when these
describe high rates of resistance or the emergence of a novel re-
sistance mechanism to a key antibiotic.
Mechanisms to unlock AMR data
Incentivizing access to data from academia and pharma
‘Bottom-up’ research and pharma activity that generates AMR
data is not public health surveillance in the strict sense.
Furthermore, the majority of researchers and pharma-employed
scientists would be quick to highlight that public health surveil-
lance is neither their responsibility nor area of interest. Agreeing on
the principle that researchers and pharma companies could make
a major contribution to global surveillance should be aligned with
the recognition that this is not their primary purpose and will be
associated with a financial cost. Debate is required about
incentives to support the additional workload associated with
sharing data with national programmes or other repositories and
who should coordinate this. This discussion could draw on experi-
ence gained from academic incentives during the development of
the WorldWide Antimalarial Resistance Network (WWARN) plat-
form.18 Any investment should not detract from funding that pro-
vides improved data sources for patient care, surveillance and
prevention of AMR.
The flow of research-generated data into global initiatives
could be facilitated by funders, who could develop guidelines on
sharing of specific datasets, a procedure that could become an in-
tegral component of a successful funding award. This is already
the case for some forms of data, examples being the submission
of all sequence data generated by the Wellcome Sanger Institute
to public databases and funding by Wellcome being linked to an
open access publication policy. Such changes would require a clear
plan for formatting and destination of data deposition. Journals
and publishers could also develop guidelines on data deposition
for publications on drug-resistant infection and could make this a
necessary part of submission. Data released into public databases
by researchers would need to be protected by data access com-
mittees or through other mechanisms, but this is not insurmount-
able because solutions are already in place for numerous types of
data. There are also examples of training and data sharing/open
access agreements having been developed that are contextual-
ized and locally acceptable.19,20
Wellcome has begun to address access to untapped sources of
global surveillance data held by pharma through a recently funded
project conducted by the Open Data Institute. This has created a
mechanism to bring together leaders from public health and the
pharmaceutical industry, who are collaborating to explore how
value could be added by the reuse of available data. An evaluation
of the mechanisms and barriers to making this open access
has been completed and detailed in a post-project report.21
One proposal is to create a public–private partnership to im-
prove local laboratory capacity. Another is to suggest that rele-
vant metadata and denominator data are also collected,
fulfilling the objectives of the pharma project whilst also provid-
ing information about local AMR prevalence that, while not
informing individual patient care, could inform empirical pre-
scribing protocols.
Supporting ministries of health to access data
Ministries of health could collaborate with research institutions
where this is not already the case or a public–private partnership
could be forged so that data generated by research, pharma or pri-
vate laboratories can be submitted to GLASS as national data.
There are examples of research units in Asia and Africa that have
already developed close and sustainable working relationships
with the relevant ministry of health, which uses the information
provided to shape national prescribing policies. In this way, coun-
tries can be empowered to utilize data generated in their own
territory, with local researchers undertaking in-depth analyses
using a range of sources, thereby encouraging comparisons of in-
cidence and prevalence rates of drug-resistant infection between
different areas in the country in order to monitor the disease
burden and the impact of action plans in each area. This also rep-
resents an important training opportunity for government
staff, who can develop the technical capability to analyse data
that are ultimately generated through country-led capacity
building.
The need for specialist networks
Having argued that the development of new initiatives that effect-
ively replicate WHO GLASS and that fragment data are generally to
be discouraged, there are some circumstances when additional
networks add vital new information. A notable example is the
Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, which has recently
been funded by a joint award from Wellcome, the UK Fleming
Fund and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to gather, map
and analyse disease and death caused by drug-resistant infec-
tions. This will be used to quantify the global burden of disease
(GBD) due to drug-resistant infections compared with other dis-
eases and causes of death, and so inform policy- and decision-
making. Estimating the GBD due to AMR faces numerous chal-
lenges, including difficulties in linking surveillance data with clinical
or outcome data and causal attribution, and cannot be regarded
as a routine surveillance activity at present.
Investing in innovation
Investment is needed to promote innovation in AMR surveillance.
For example, harnessing emerging technologies relating to ‘Big
Data’ and artificial intelligence could lead to more effective mech-
anisms of AMR data capture, sharing and analysis tools. An innova-
tive system to support automatic data harmonization between
different laboratories and institutions could achieve numerous
objectives, including: an inbuilt system to standardize data ana-
lysis and quality tests for data from multiple sources; capture of
patient outcome data to underpin calculations of GBD; and rapid
relay of information to treating clinicians, e.g. via electronic deci-
sion support algorithms. Data could be automatically linked to na-
tional agencies and international data repositories. Innovation in
data capture would benefit from early involvement of experts in
the social sciences so that the behaviour change required to sup-
port buy-in is an integral part of planning and development.
Mapping of data sources may also require consideration of the
regulatory environment in some settings. Innovation needs to be
linked to effective translation, scale-up and integration, and
assessed in terms of impact on policy.22 Any alternative system
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developed will need to be either fully interoperable with WHO
GLASS or able to generate data in a format that can be uploaded.
Conclusions and next steps
Our understanding of the GBD due to drug-resistant infection in
LMICs is rudimentary and data from academia, pharma and pri-
vate laboratories could make an important and rapid contribution.
A dialogue is required to determine how data generated in LMICs
might flow from these bodies to national and global AMR surveil-
lance networks and how they might support the development of
laboratory and analytical capacity, including robust quality-man-
agement systems, for prospective data collection. This should
build on current initiatives such as the Fleming Fund, which is pro-
viding regional grants to collect existing AMR and antimicrobial use
data from all possible sources. Table 1 summarizes proposed
changes that could help to bring this into effect.
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